(2012). A Review of “The Quest for Citizenship: African American and Native American Education in Kansas”. Educational Studies: Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 203-207.

The Patient Self Determination Act of 1991 brought much needed attention to the importance of advance care planning and surrogate decision-making. The purpose of this law is to ensure that a patient’s preferences for medical care are recognized and promoted, even if the patient loses decision-making capacity. In general, patients are presumed to have DMC. A patient’s DMC may come under question when distortions in thinking and understanding due to illness, delirium, depression or other psychiatric symptoms are identified or suspected. (...) Physicians and other healthcare professionals working in hospital settings where medical illness is frequently comorbid with depression, adjustment disorders, demoralization and suicidal ideation, can expect to encounter ethical tension when medically sick patients who are also depressed or suicidal request do not resuscitate orders. (shrink)

This paper argues for the benefits of approaching the terrorist attacks executed by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway on 22 July 2011 from the perspective of Luce Irigaray’s philosophy. In Breivik’s right-wing manifesto 2083, he identifies the triumvirate cultural Marxism, Islam and feminism as the main culprits for Europe’s decay. Despite arguing for the superiority of the white European race, and the dangers of immigration and religious plurality for Europe’s future, Breivik denies the value of difference, be it sexual, cultural (...) or religious. This paper finds support in Irigaray’s philosophy when arguing that, in this respect, Breivik’s extremist ideology operates in alignment with Western metaphysics that posits the masculine European subject as ‘the lord of the earth’, who denies all differences other than the ones hailed by male, white, Christian supremacists. In Norway, the dangers that Breivik and his allies represent are real, given that academics are being targeted and threatened. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:720 Feminist Studies 42, no. 3. © 2016 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Julie R. Enszer “She Who Shouts Gets Heard!”: Counting and Accounting for Women Writers in Literary Grants and Norton Anthologies In 1979, the Coordinating Council of Literary Magazines (CCLM), a New York-based nonprofit that supported literary magazines through technical assistance and grant-making, announced a new program: CCLM editor fellowships.1 Editor fellowships came with a $5,000 grant. (...) Members of the literary community nominated editors to CCLM for the award. Adrienne Rich nominated Ellen Marie Bissert, editor of the feminist journal 13th Moon, and Mab Segrest, editor of Feminary: A Feminist Journal for the South Emphasizing the Lesbian Vision, for the editor fellowships. In 1979, the inaugural year of the prize, among the ten winners, not one was a woman. Bissert was one of three honorable mentions. Bissert rejected the distinction with a public letter to Maureen Owen, the only woman on the CCLM board of directors. Bissert deplored “the sexism inherent in the panelists’ decisions.”2 Several feminist publications reprinted Bissert’s letter while “the male small press gave it scant 1. The work of CCLM continues today, although now the organization is called the Council for Literary Magazines and Presses (CLMP). Under the leadership of Jeffrey Lependorf, the nonprofit organization continues to be a vital advocate for small magazines and publishers. 2. Open letter from Ellen Marie Bissert to Maureen Owen, June 28, 1980, CCLM Editors’ Grant 1980 folder, box 6, 13th Moon records, New York Public Library, Rare Books and Manuscripts Division (hereafter, CCLM folder). Julie R. Enszer 721 coverage.”3 As a result of Bissert’s objections, CCLM released the application statistics: 225 people were nominated, forty (18%) were women, and fifteen (7%) were non-white men. Of the 124 people who completed the applications, twenty-three (19%) were women and eleven (9%) were nonwhite men. There were thirty-three semifinalists, five (15%) women and four (12%) non-white men. These numbers shocked and outraged Bissert and other feminists. Adrienne Rich wrote to Maureen Owen, “I am appalled by the blatant sexism evidenced in the Council’s decision to fund ten male editors.”4 The attention that Bissert brought to the grant process resulted in a special meeting of the CCLM board to “discuss the controversy” and the awards.5 The next year, the CCLM editor fellowships went to five journals run by women and five run by men; one of the winners of the $5,000 award in 1980 was the editorial collective of Conditions, a magazine of writing by women with an emphasis on writing by lesbians.6 In a letter to readers of Conditions, the three editors, Elly Bulkin, Jan Clausen, and Rima Shore, noted that the “feminist protest following the announcement of the 1979 awards no doubt had an impact on the decision-making process” and that the award “represents the only substantial payment we have received, or seem likely to receive, for our editorial work, and we were greatly encouraged by it.”7 Maureen Owen acknowledged the importance of Bissert’s protests saying it “strengthened my position on the board at CCLM and the position of women editors and writers in general. She who shouts, get heard!”8 In 1979, Bissert, Rich, and other feminists demonstrated the importance of shouting about the inclusion of women in systems of literary appraisal; they recognized the important economic consequences of grants for feminist publishers and feminist authors. Thirty years later, in 2009, Cate Marvin and Erin Belieu founded VIDA: Women in Literary Arts to promote “conversations regarding the critical reception 3. Open letter from Bissert to Owen. 4. Rich to Owen, August 7, 1979, CCLM folder. 5. Open letter from Bissert to Owen. 6. Press release, June 11, 1980, CCLM folder. 7. Elly Bulkin, Jan Clausen, and Rima Shore, Conditions 7, unnumbered front matter. 8. Postcard from Owen to Bissert, undated, CCLM folder. 722 Julie R. Enszer of women’s creative writing in our current culture.”9 Each February or March since 2010, VIDA releases “the count”: a compilation of the gender breakdown of prizes, reviews, and literary journals in the United States. VIDA’s numbers demonstrate bias toward men in... (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page W15-W16.

This inaugural volume of the Journal of the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists aims with its Issue 1 to clarify methodological issues that emerge when we rediscover the history of women philosophers. It is devoted to the questions which go hand in hand with the rediscovery of the history of women philosophers and scientists, asking whether and how we should place these newly discovered texts within the traditional patriarchal context. We do not know yet whether women are making different (...) ways into canonical thought, or whether we should abandon the idea of canonical thought at all. Submissions that we received for the first call for papers are subsumed under the theme “Beyond Borders.” Each article deals in some way with the writing or rewriting of women’s history, filling in lapsus in the historical canons of philosophy and related disciplines, addressing the gendered political intellectual tradition from modern India, engaging with the works and ideas of women thinkers. The light-hearted title of Karen Green’s article belies the seriousness of the question it poses. In “The Human in Feminist Philosophy: Or Woman Is a Social Animal, I’m Not So Sure about Man”, Green questions the adequacy of the structuralist account of language after critically assessing its role in feminist theory since the 1970s. Green argues that the hegemony of structuralism is as much a Western hegemony as the Enlightenment tradition of a transcendent subject. Texts historically written and published by women provide the raw material for an archaeology of the female subject, which, Green argues, leads to the discovery and exploration of the female subject. She offers an initial sketch of the results of such an exploration, concluding that many male theorists have portrayed humans as inherently self-centred and egoistic, while most female philosophers have assumed that humans are inherently social. Laura Kotevska’s contribution “Writing Women into the History of Philosophy: Contextualism Re-Examined” examines the advantages and disadvantages of contextualism as used as a methodology. Philosophical works by women have been neglected by historians of philosophy until recent decades. When such works were discussed, it was usually in the context of male philosophers with whom a female philosopher was associated in some way. Kotevska explores how different options for a contextualist history of philosophy can help explain a woman’s involvement in philosophy, or how they can undermine her intellectual authority and cloud our understanding of her work. To avoid some of the epistemically damaging results that can arise when a woman’s work is placed in her patriarchal context, Kotevska concludes with three suggestions for writing and teaching works produced by women, suggestions informed by the methodological considerations addressed in the essay. Priyanka Jha’s contribution addresses “The Shaping of the ‘Political’: Gendered Intellectual History of Ideas in Modern India (1880s–1940s)”. Her premise is that in most societies, women’s thought has been reflected in a significant and robust ‘political’ tradition, that this tradition of women’s political thought is situated in a larger universe of ideas than is commonly thought. Women have been and continue to be important interlocutors in debates about concerns and values that are central to the human condition. However, the kind of centrality and attention that should have been given to this school of thought as a “political tradition” has either been barely noticed or marginalized in comparison to other ideational currents. This act is not peculiar to postcolonial societies like India but has a global resonance and a universal scope. There are very few women who have been active as political thinkers or political philosophers worldwide. This paper locates the gendered tradition of political intellectuals in modern India by examining the works and ideas of women thinkers. In the paper on “Women and Freedom of Canonical Thought: A Propaedeutics”, Christine Lopes starts from the observation that in male or patriarchal canonical thinking there is no unified image and representation of women. She uses this broad space of presentation and calls this “the ways of women”. At the same time, she notes that even today we do not know whether women will bring different ways or possibly femininely coherent ways to canonical thought, or whether we can create women’s canonical thought or abandon the idea of canonical thought. For all, therefore, it can be stated that we are given the freedom to judge canonical thinking, to include or exclude ourselves, to adapt or not. The paper discusses some basic epistemological assumptions about such freedom. Bodil Hvass Kjems begins her reflections on “The Inclusion of Women in the Curriculum of Philosophy: Challenges and Solutions” with the fact that recent decades have made accessible an overwhelming number of philosophical works by women, but that the original conflict is still present. The sheer abundance of material is far from being adequately reflected in the curricula of philosophy departments. It therefore raises the question, as many do, of what the best argumentative strategy would be to make such inclusion successful. In doing so, the author references proposals, such as those of Sarah Tyson (2014), to frame the debate in the following way. For the author, the question is whether misogyny is an intrinsic feature of the (Western) philosophical tradition or merely an unfortunate development. That is, whether the response to the integration of women’s texts is corrective or transformative to the dominant model. In doing so, it assumes that both strategies, regardless of the ontological status of the philosophical discipline, promote engagement with women’s work in ways that revolutionise contemporary philosophical practice. In her article “Privacy, Feminism, and Moral Responsibility in the Work of Elizabeth Lane Beardsley”, Julie van Camp looks at the work of an important moral philosopher, Elizabeth Lane Beardsley. The article highlights Beardsley’s philosophical contributions. Using Beardsley as a case study, van Camp points to more general problems in recognizing the work of women philosophers and ensuring their rightful place in our professional dialogue. Van Camp considers sociological and professional factors that may partly explain why the work of women philosophers has not always received the attention it seems to deserve in professional dialogue. The article concludes with suggestions about efforts we can make to address these problems, including the selection of readings for our courses and the sources we consult for our own research and writings, as well as the preservation of records of conferences and other public gatherings that honor women philosophers. (shrink)

From the Supreme Court to the bedroom, privacy is an intensely contested interest in our everyday lives and privacy law. Some people appeal to privacy to protect such critical areas as abortion, sexuality, and personal information. Yet, privacy skeptics argue that there is no such thing as a right to privacy. I argue that we cannot abandon the concept of privacy. If we wish to avoid extending this elusive concept to cover too much of our lives or shrinking it to (...) cover too little, we must come to understand it. After exploring the privacy arguments of philosophers and constitutional and tort privacy law, I argue for a new definition of privacy and an explanation of its value that clarifies and resolves many of our conflicts. Privacy is critical because it allows us to protect a realm in which we can have intimate relations with others. (shrink)

In the recent methodological individualism-holism debate on explanation, there has been considerable focus on what reasons methodological holists may advance in support of their position. We believe it is useful to approach the other direction and ask what considerations methodological individualists may in fact offer in favor of their view about explanation. This is the background for the question we pursue in this paper: Why be a methodological individualist? We start out by introducing the methodological individualism-holism debate while distinguishing two (...) forms of methodological individualism: a form that says that individualist explanations are always better than holist accounts and a form that says that providing intervening individualist mechanisms always makes for better explanations than purely holist ones. Next, we consider four lines of reasoning in support of methodological individualism: arguments from causation, from explanatory depth, from agency, and from normativity. We argue that none of them offer convincing reasons in support of the two explanatory versions of individualism we consider. While there may well be occasions in which individualists’ favorite explanations are superior, we find no reason to think this always must be the case. (shrink)

Reactivity in qualitative data collection occurs when a researcher generates data about a situation with reactivity, that is, a situation in which the ongoing research affects the research participants such that they, say, diverge from their routines when the researcher is present, or tell the researcher what they think she wants to hear. In qualitative research, there are two basic approaches to reactivity. The traditional position maintains that data should ideally be collected in situations without any reactivity. In other words, (...) good data are reactivity free. By contrast, the more recent view holds that data from situations with reactivity are fine as long as the researcher is aware of the occurring reactivity so that she can take it into account when interpreting her data. In this fashion, good data are reactivity transparent. In this paper, I first spell out and defend the more recent approach to reactivity. I argue that qualitative data are reactivity transparent when conjoined with true reactivity assumptions and that, thus supplemented, data are informative about social life independently of its being studied. Next, I examine various issues raised by the requirement to put forth true reactivity assumptions. Lastly, I use my discussion of reactivity transparency as a basis for providing a framework for thinking about good qualitative data. (shrink)

This book is the most comprehensive and rigourous critique of the ways disciplinary boundaries still inhibit knowledge-production and integration.

Qualitative researchers sometimes talk about objectivity in relation to qualitative data sets. In this paper, I defend a reconstructed notion of objective qualitative data sets that may serve as a useful and reachable guiding ideal in qualitative data generation. In the first part of the paper, I develop the ideal. According to it, a qualitative data set is objective to the extent that it, in conjunction with true assumptions, possesses a combination of good-making features in virtue of which the data (...) set is suited to serve as evidence base for a satisfying answer to the research question under study. In the second part of the paper, I examine and reject two possible lines of objection to this ideal: One is that it picks out the wrong good-making features. The other is that the very focus on good-making features is misguided: the objectivity of a qualitative data set should instead be seen as a matter of how it was generated or evaluated. (shrink)

In this paper the authors argue that the exploration of the nature of needs and rights should begin with the actually existing organization of care and of justice in society. The authors raise two key concerns with this organization: 1) the invisibility of care to some, and 2) the inaccessibility of rights to others. Recent work by care scholars has called attention to the ways the current organization of care work perpetuates the myth of self-sufficiency for some, while reducing others (...) to mere dependents. Law and Society scholars have demonstrated the problems of uneven access to legal remedies within the current organization of the legal system. Addressing these concerns simultaneously reveals both the problems of the current organization of needs and rights as well as illuminating alternative possibilities. The authors argue, first, that a justice perspective, based on rights is inadequate because its presumed universality is belied by the reality of the inaccessibility of rights to many. Second, the authors argue that a care perspective, currently formulated upon the assumption that only some people have needs, is also flawed because its presumed particularity distorts the human experience and subsequent policies. Instead, the authors need to conceive of care in a public way that permits both rights and needs to be understood as applicable to all. The authors propose some initial thoughts about how to create such a public concept of care. (shrink)

This paper discusses the so-called non-interference assumption (NIA) grounding causal inference in trials in both medicine and the social sciences. It states that for each participant in the experiment, the value of the potential outcome depends only upon whether she or he gets the treatment. Drawing on methodological discussion in clinical trials and laboratory experiments in economics, I defend the necessity of partial forms of blinding as a warrant of the NIA, to control the participants’ expectations and their strategic interactions (...) with the experimenter. (shrink)

The introduction provides an overview of the ontological and the methodological individualism-holism debates. Moreover, these debates are briefly discussed in relation to two kindred disputes: The micro-macro and the agency-structure debates. Finally, the contributions to this book are briefly presented.

The article makes four interrelated claims: (1) The mechanism approach to social explanation does not presuppose a commitment to the individual-level microfoundationalism. (2) The microfoundationalist requirement that explanatory social mechanisms should always consists of interacting individuals has given rise to problematic methodological biases in social research. (3) It is possible to specify a number of plausible candidates for social macro-mechanisms where interacting collective agents (e.g. formal organizations) form the core actors. (4) The distributed cognition perspective combined with organization studies could (...) provide us with explanatory understanding of the emergent cognitive capacities of collective agents. (shrink)

An empirical study of whether the ordinary conception of race in the United States is biological or social, and how different conceptions connect to racism.

Depuis plusieurs décennies, la numérisation des textes anciens et les progrès du TAL pour les traiter et les interroger ont largement modifié nos habitudes de travail. Il est désormais possible d’obtenir des données quantitatives massives qui affinent notre perception des phénomènes linguistiques et stylistiques dans des corpus écrits dans des états de langue anciens. Les corpus numériques créés depuis maintenant près d’un quart de siècle permettent d’envisager plus facilement la dynamique du...

The common assumption is that if a group comprising moral agents can act intentionally, as a group, then the group itself can also be properly regarded as a moral agent with respect to that action. I argue, however, that this common assumption is the result of a problematic line of reasoning I refer to as “the collective fallacy.” Recognizing the collective fallacy as a fallacy allows us to see that if there are, in fact, irreducibly joint actors, then some of (...) them will lack the full-fledged moral agency of their members. The descriptivist question of whether a group can perform irreducibly joint intentional action need not rise and fall with the normative question of whether a group can be a moral agent. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a partial analysis of the role of values in qualitative data collection in social research. The partial analysis shows that nonepistemic values have both required and permissible roles to play during this phase of research. By appeal to the analysis, I reject the ideal of value-free science as applied to qualitative data collection, and I demonstrate why two alternative ideals should likewise be dismissed as standards for values in qualitative data collection. Also, I briefly discuss (...) the extent to which the partial analysis carries over to quantitative data collection in social research. (shrink)

I take it as given that we manage to linguistically refer to objects we can neither perceive nor uniquely describe. Kripke accounts for this fact by appeal to causal-historical chains of communication. But Evans famously presented what has seemed to many a devastating counterexample to Kripke’s view: the phenomenon of reference-shifting. Here, I’ll agree with critics that Kripke’s view is insufficient to handle cases of reference shift, but I’ll argue for an alternative version of the causal-historical account that is immune (...) to Evans’ counterexample. The key move will be at the foundations; it will require a change in what it is we’re giving a causal-historical account of. Critically, I’ll argue that we should reject two claims associated with the causal-historical picture. First, we should reject the claim that names are used to think of their referents. Second, we should reject the claim that later speakers defer to earlier ones. (shrink)

Let me make it clear from the outset that my main point isnoteither of the following: one, that there should be more women economists and research on “women's issues”, or two, that women as a class do, or should do, economics in a manner different from men. My argument is different and has to do with trying to gain an understanding of how a certain way of thinking about gender and a certain way of thinking about economics have become intertwined (...) through metaphor – with detrimental results – and how a richer conception of human understanding and human identity could broaden and improve the field of economics for both female and male practitioners. (shrink)

Convergence of model projections is often considered by climate scientists to be an important objective in so far as it may indicate the robustness of the models’ core hypotheses. Consequently, the range of climate projections from a multi-model ensemble, called “model spread”, is often expected to reduce as climate research moves forward. However, the successive Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change indicate no reduction in model spread, whereas it is indisputable that climate science has made improvements in (...) its modelling. In this paper, after providing a detailed explanation of the situation, we describe an epistemological setting in which a steady model spread is not doomed to be seen as negative, and is indeed compatible with a desirable evolution of climate models taken individually. We further argue that, from the perspective of collective progress, as far as the improvement of the products of a multi-model ensemble is concerned, reduction of model spread is of lower priority than model independence. (shrink)

Historically the terms “final,” “unconditional,” and “intrinsic” have played a foundational role in ethical theory. I argue that final/instrumental distinction is best understood in terms of the for-sake-of relation and involves a tri-part division of goods. I show that this first way of categorizing goods is more closely aligned with a second way of categorizing goods in terms of intrinsic/extrinsic goods than has thus far been acknowledged. Lastly, I distinguish yet a third way of categorizing goods: unconditional/conditional goods. While the (...) final/instrumental and intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions have received the lion’s share of philosophical attention, the unconditional/conditional distinction is no less important. (shrink)

Achieving equity in international research is one of the pressing concerns of the twenty-first century. In this era of progressive globalization, there are many opportunities for the deliberate or accidental export of unethical research practices from high-income regions to low- and middle-income countries and emerging economies. The export of unethical practices, termed “ethics dumping,” may occur through all forms of research and can affect individuals, communities, countries, animals, and the environment. Ethics dumping may be the result of purposeful exploitation but (...) often arises from lack of awareness of good ethical and governance practice. This chapter describes the work of the TRUST project toward counteracting the practice of ethics dumping through the development of tools for the improvement of research governance structures. Multi-stakeholder consultation informs all of TRUST’s developments. Most importantly, this gives voice to marginalized vulnerable groups and indigenous people, who have been equal and active partners throughout the project. At the heart of the TRUST project is an ambitious aim to develop a Global Code of Conduct for Research in Resource-Poor Settings. Uniquely, the Code provides guidance across all research disciplines in clear, short statements, focusing on research collaborations that entail considerable imbalances of power, resources and knowledge and using a new framework based on the values of fairness, respect, care, and honesty. The code was recently adopted by the European Commission as a reference document for Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe. (shrink)

It is currently common to conceive of the classic methodological individualism–holism debate in level terms. Accordingly, the dispute is taken to concern the proper level of explanations in the social sciences. In this paper, I argue that the debate is not apt to be characterized in level terms. The reason is that widely adopted notions of individualist explanations do not qualify as individual-level explanations because they span multiple levels. I defend this claim relative to supervenience, emergence, and other accounts of (...) the social world as levelled. Moreover, I discuss the consequences of this finding for the ongoing methodological individualism–holism debate. (shrink)

JohnLocke’s 1700–1702 correspondencewith Dutch Arminian Philippus van Limborch has been taken by commentators as the motivation for modifications to the fifth edition of “Of Power,” the chapter in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that treats freedom. In this paper, I offer the first systematic and chronological study of their correspondence. I argue that the heart of their disagreement is over how they define “freedom of indifference.” Once the importance of the disagreement over indifference is established, it is clear that when (...) Locke altered parts of “Of Power” as a reaction to Limborch’s questioning, he did so in the interest of further clarifying and solidifying his view, not changing it. Seeing how they disagree over indifference also allows us to see the correspondence as showcasing the conflict between intellectualism, the view that cognitive states determine the will, and voluntarism, the view that the will alone determines action. (shrink)

2017 substantive revision of the original 2008 "Continental Rationalism" entry (and 2012 revision) that introduces women and non-European authors and new historiographical considerations.

I consider why women philosophers, once identified and given recognition, too often seem to drop from the intellectual radar screen or, at least, to drop mainly to the land of footnotes and bibliographies. Are they disappearing any more than men of comparable stature from their generation? Is there anything we can do about this? Can we do more than excavate and recognize women in philosophy? What can we do to continue and enhance their presence in the historic dialogue of philosophy?

Building upon the foundations laid by Russell, Donnellan, Chastain, and more recently, Almog, this paper addresses key questions about the basic mechanism by which we think of worldly objects, and (in contrast to many connected projects), does so in isolation from questions about how we speak of them. I outline and defend a view based on the notion of bound cognition. Bound cognition, like perception, is world-to-mind in the sense that it is generated by the item being thought of rather (...) than by the mind doing the thinking. It is a direct, two-place, non-representational relation, and it is prior to any epistemic connection between the thinker and the object of thought. Although the paradigm case for bound cognition involves sensory perception of an individual, I argue that the cognitive relations falling under the heading of bound cognition also include non-perceptual cognitive relations (such as the relation between a thinker and a historical individual) as well as cognitive relations to non-individuals (such as pairs, pluralities, species, and features). Four illustrative cases are discussed, and anticipated worries about abstract and empty cases are addressed. (shrink)

Death of a normal volunteer highlights problems with research review and protection of subjectsHealthy volunteer dies in asthma studyOn July 19, after investigating the death of a previously healthy volunteer, the United States Office for Human Research Protections suspended nearly all federally funded medical research involving human subjects at Johns Hopkins University. The death has been described as “particularly disturbing” because 24 year old Ellen Roche was a healthy volunteer who had nothing to gain by taking part in the (...) study.1 Her death has revived debate about the adequacy of oversight of medical research that followed the death of 18 year old Jesse Gelsinger who volunteered for a gene therapy experiment.Ellen Roche was a 24 year old technician from the Johns Hopkins Asthma and Allergy Centre who volunteered to take part in a study designed to provoke a mild asthma attack in order to help doctors discover the reflex that protects the lungs of healthy people against asthma attacks. After inhaling hexamethonium, a medication used for treating high blood pressure in the 1950s and 60s, Ms Roche became ill. She developed a cough and her condition worsened over the next week until she was put on a ventilator. With her lung tissue breaking down, blood pressure falling and her kidneys beginning to fail, nothing could be done to save her.2 She died on June 2, about a month after entering the study.The Office for Human Research Protections investigated the circumstances of Ms Roche's death and accused the Hopkins Institutional Review Board of failing to take proper precautions. It also evaluated the human subject protection system at Hopkins. The OHRP found that prior to approving the study, Hopkins researcher …. (shrink)

This paper explores the development of Honneth’s thought on work. It considers how his initial concerns with the embodied experience of labour and the absence of a contemporary and compelling class-specific lexicon with which to explore suffering at work have been surpassed and subordinated by his analysis of the social relations of recognition in civil society, which is distributed according to a contested and contestable achievement principle. I argue that despite the purchase of the criticisms offered by recent rejoinders, they (...) fail to engage with the strength of his analysis: that modern economics contains a normative (recognition) order which works to justify the extant division of labour and income, even if its current formulation supports inequity, exclusion and exploitation. Feminist political economy is an ally in this analysis. The paper explores the points of intersection between these projects, but argues that incorporating feminist insights will require a fundamental revision to Honneth’s account of social rationalization in modernity. (shrink)

Abstract An important strand of theories of practice stress that individuals' practical knowledge, i.e., their ability to act in appropriate and/or effective ways, is mainly tacit. This means that the social scientist cannot find out about this knowledge by simply asking the individuals she studies to articulate how it is appropriate and/or effective to act in various circumstances. In this paper, I pursue the proposal that the method of participant observation may be used to find out about individuals' practical knowledge. (...) Surprisingly, the literature does not contain any systematic and comprehensive discussion of this suggestion. I distinguish and exemplify four types of observation that are indicative of individuals' practical knowledge. The observations may serve as a basis for the social scientist's formulations of this knowledge. Further, I point to two main ways in which things may go wrong when the social scientist uses participant observation to find out about individuals' practical knowledge. I argue that the social scientist can make reasonably sure to avoid these two potential difficulties. Accordingly, I conclude that these difficulties do not undermine the effectiveness of the method. In this sense, social scientists are right to use the method of participant observation to find out about individuals' practical knowledge. (shrink)

In a series of powerful and challenging articles emerging since the mid-1990s, Brian Leiter has argued that certain theoretical strains in contemporary legal philosophy are ‘epistemologically bankrupt’, in virtue of their reliance on misguided argumentative devices: analysing concepts, such as the concepts of law and of authority; and doing so by appealing to intuitions regarding the correct way to understand the concepts in question. In response to this state of affairs, Leiter advocates that jurisprudence ought to attempt to catch-up with (...) ‘naturalistic’ developments which have influenced the direction of other branches of philosophy – such as epistemology, philosophy of mind, and moral philosophy – in the last few decades. This article offers a critical analysis of some of Leiter’s proposals for what Jurisprudence should become, in light of his views on the relevance of naturalism for this discipline. (shrink)

Cet essai prend en vue le paradoxe que soulève l’exégèse eckhartienne du verset Ex. 15, 3, dans le commentaire du livre de l’ Exode, à propos de l’objection formulée par la thèse dionysienne, dans la Hiérarchie céleste, chapitre 2, § 3, selon laquelle toute affirmation au sujet de Dieu est incompacte, tandis que Maître Eckhart soutient qu’elle est propre. Maître Eckhart limite la portée de l’objection dionysienne au mode de signifier selon l’inhérence et renverse l’incompacité des affirmations au sujet de (...) Dieu en compacité, dès lors que ces dernières sont prises selon le mode de signifier selon l’identité essentielle. (shrink)

Arts and Humanities in Higher Education, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 198-219, April 2022. This article presents playfulness as an emerging approach to learning in higher education that emphasises the arts and humanities across disciplines. The article is based on a qualitative, hermeneutical literature review in light of educational culture in higher education. The literature review indicates that playful approaches to learning stand in opposition to educational cultures that focus on rapidness and student performance. However, an educational culture of play (...) is about to establish itself, and this culture of play emphasises creativity in learning and human flourishing in education, perspectives that are connected to arts and humanities. The main findings cultures of time, performance and play lead to several questions about societal, institutional, and organisational educational culture, and regarding approaches to teaching, learning, humanity and society. The main contribution of this article is that a focus on playfulness offer the field of arts and humanities new possibilities in future education. (shrink)

While the concept of hospitality involves paradoxes, Kant’s theory of cosmopolitanism partly overcomes them by transforming the ethical requirement of hospitality into a condition for realizing any right. Because exchange, commerce (commercium), and the mutual recognition of freedoms are at the basis of any political association, as they are on a larger scale of any coexistence of political communities, they constitute the primary relationship on which the duty of hospitality is based. Therefore, the Kantian theory of cosmopolitanism is a theory (...) of the institutionalization of hospitality. Nevertheless, while the institutionalization of moral requirements generally implies a loss of their critical force, Kant offers a legal theory of hospitality that reinforces its critical and political dimension. Beyond Kant, hospitality can be developed as justifying protests from citizens against any policy pursued by their governments when the latter contravenes the principle of reciprocity through practices of domination both at the domestic and international levels. Linked to a sense of justice on a global scale, hospitality opens a reflection on the obligations and responsibilities that members of society have when their rulers pursue imperial agendas. Kant’s cosmopolitanism can thus be developed as a critical cosmopolitanism or a critical politics of hospitality. (shrink)

This article seeks to examine recent popular fiction on Richard of Gloucester (1452–1485), later Richard III. Of particular focus is the portrayal of Richard's pet hounds — specifically the Irish wolfhound depicted in Sharon Penman's novel, The Sunne in Splendour (1982). The article investigates the dialectic between the mythology of Richard as overplayed villain and as domestic family man, with the wolfhound as the centre-piece of this domesticity — an iconography which is at odds with the traditional stereotypes of Richard.

This paper is the first of two in a series. In this paper, we identify mental health needs and challenges in the age of COVID-19 among Nepali-speaking, Bhutanese resettled refugees in the USA. We argue for a public health justice framework that looks critically at social determinants impacting mental health (SDIMH) barriers, which negatively impact our Bhutanese population, and serves as a theoretical foundation toward public policy and law that will inform healthcare decisions and fair treatment of resettled refugees at (...) the clinical bedside and in the community. We first describe our Bhutanese refugee population and the critical mental health issues that, for many, originated during political persecution and violent ethnic cleansing initiatives, or while living in refugee camps prior to resettlement to the USA. We present a social justice framework emerging from an extensive literature review and incorporating core social determinants specific to mental health in the age of COVID-19, which are guided by the social determinants of economic stability; neighborhoods and physical environment; education; nutrition and exercise; community and social context; healthcare system; and legal system. We illustrate specific SDIMH of our resettled Bhutanese refugees during the pandemic, followed by a second paper that details recommendations for applying the SDIMH in a collective effort to address specific barriers to mental healthcare and support. (shrink)

Historically the terms “final,” “unconditional,” and “intrinsic” have played a foundational role in ethical theory. I argue that final/instrumental distinction is best understood in terms of the for-sake-of relation and involves a tri-part division of goods. I show that this first way of categorizing goods is more closely aligned with a second way of categorizing goods in terms of intrinsic/extrinsic goods than has thus far been acknowledged. Lastly, I distinguish yet a third way of categorizing goods: unconditional/conditional goods. While the (...) final/instrumental and intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions have received the lion’s share of philosophical attention, the unconditional/conditional distinction is no less important. (shrink)

The emergence of a new tissue economy raises issues for the governance of risk and concepts of the body and self. This article explores the development of autologous cell therapies as a form of tissue engineering and considers how and why autologous applications are seen as less risky and more socially and politically acceptable. In a careful analysis of contemporary debates around the need for new international policies to regulate these technologies, we critically assess the discursive strategies employed to support (...) ideas of the body as a natural entity. Central to these debates are assumptions that autologous applications do not threaten the moral or corporeal integrity of the individual and that they are ‘an ethics-free zone’. Analysis reveals that concepts such as intercorporeality need to be refined if they are to assist our understanding of these cell-based therapies. We consider the biopolitics of Autologous Chondrocyte Implantation (ACI) in order to show the linkages between the culturing of cells, regulation and the reproduction of the self. (shrink)